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Sklar: Executing Equity: The Broad Judicial Discretion to Stay the Execu

NOTE
EXECUTING EQUITY: THE BROAD JUDICIAL
DISCRETION TO STAY THE EXECUTION OF
DEATH SENTENCES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Stays of executions of sentences are equitable remedies' provided
to defendants to allow them full and fair consideration of their
sentences. 2 The courts' exercise of their power to stay executions is
often crucial for the proper administration of justice.3 However, courts
do not employ bright-line rules when evaluating petitions to stay the
execution of sentences. 4 Rather, the power to grant or deny stays lies in
the exercise of each court's judgment.5 As a result, decisions that can
affect a person's life and liberty are left to the discretion of the courts.6
This broad discretion granted to courts has resulted in unpredictable
1. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). When a stay is granted, "the state is
enjoined from implementing" the imposed sentence and the claims of the petitioner are allowed to
be heard. Nicole Veilleux, Note, Staying Death Penalty Executions: An Empirical Analysis of
ChangingJudicialAttitudes, 84 GEO. LJ. 2543, 2545 (1996).
2. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2546 (explaining that stays function to provide the court with
sufficient time to hear petitioner's claims); see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(explaining that criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal");
White v. Wainwright, 632 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Chambers v. Bowersox,
197 F.3d 308, 309 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting the motion for stay of execution, finding that defendants
should not be executed without receiving "the full review process").
3. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 285 (1953); see also Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942) (explaining that stays of execution are part
of the "traditional equipment for the administration of justice"); Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492
n.2 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that dates of execution are practically subject to deferral through judicial
stay orders).
4. Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty
Cases in the FederalCourts, 95 YALE L.J. 349, 359 (1985) (discussing "the need for more stringent
requirements for sentencing and review in capital punishment cases"); Veilleux, supra note 1, at
2550 (highlighting that "the rules governing stay decisions are not uniform").
5. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
6. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure
Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 218-19 (2011) (discussing the
discretion associated with appellate procedure regarding changes in legal regimes).
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procedures and results 7 and has further resulted in seemingly unjust and
inconsistent sentences. 8 Thus, the current system employed by courts in
the United States to evaluate petitions to stay executions does not
consistently provide defendants with the full and fair consideration to
which they are entitled pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 9
The injustice resulting from such broad discretion is apparent in
many cases. 10 For example, in Jacobs v. Scott," the petitioner was
executed after the U.S. Supreme Court denied his application for a stay
of execution, despite evidence implicating his innocence. 12 Similarly, in
Herrera v. Collins,' 3 although the Court agreed to hear the petitioner's
claim that new evidence would establish his innocence, it denied the
petition to stay his execution.' 4 As a result, the petitioner's imminent
execution preempted his ability to establish his innocence. 5
The recent Supreme Court decision Garcia v. Texas1 6 is a
particularly good example of the injustice associated with courts' broad
discretion in death penalty cases. 17 Garcia is one in a line of cases in

7. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 231-32 (noting that even when courts reach the same substantive
outcomes, they often apply different procedures to reach those results); see Richard L. Revesz &
Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules andthe Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1080, 1094
(1988) (discussing the "inconsistency and incoherence" resulting from the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices' views on the Court's rules of operation). Specifically, courts' choices regarding the
implementation of new law "are often idiosyncratic or even haphazard." Bruhl, supranote 6, at 219.
8. See Boaz, supra note 4, at 354 (noting that the procedures used by courts in implementing
the death penalty should strictly adhere to the "principle of fairness and reliability"); see also
Cornelius F. Murphy, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A New Hands-Off Approach,
USA TODAY, Mar. 1993, at 51, 52 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's difficulty in properly and
effectively enforcing its "unbridled discretion" associated with the death penalty).
9. The U.S. Constitution provides that, "[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Accordingly,
procedural due process of law requires a fair and impartial trial. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
135-36 (1955).
10. See Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2562-63.
11. Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Jacobs v. Texas, 513
U.S. 1070 (1995).
12. Id. at 1320.
13. 502 U.S. 1085 (1992).
14. Seeid.
15. A Texas state court judge subsequently granted petitioner a temporary stay. Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397 (1993). The Court, however, denied him federal habeas corpus relief. Id.
at 390. He was executed four months later, prior to having a chance to litigate his innocence claim.
Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2544 n.17.
16. 131 S. Ct. 2866(2011).
17. See id. at 2867.
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which foreign nationals were arrested in the United States, denied access
to their national consulates in violation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (the "VCCR"),' 8 and eventually convicted and
sentenced to death. 9 In each of these cases, the Court denied the
prisoners' petitions to stay their executions. 20 However, Garcia is
distinguishable because the Court denied the defendant's petition to stay
his execution, despite the fact that a bill, the Consular Notification
Compliance Act of 2011 (the "CNCA"), 21 had been introduced into
Congress. 22 If passed, the CNCA would have provided the defendant
with a claim to challenge his or her capital sentence.23
This Note will demonstrate how the broad discretion given to courts
to evaluate stays of execution has resulted in inconsistency and,
therefore, injustice for defendants in capital cases, as specified above.
Part II discusses the current methods applied by courts in evaluating
petitions to stay the executions of death sentences, as well as courts'
practice of granting stays where there is a pending decision, the outcome
of which will affect the petitioner's sentence. Part III uses Garcia to
demonstrate the injustice that occurs when a stay is denied despite
relevant proposed legislation that has been introduced into Congress.
Finally, Part IV discusses how guidelines surrounding stays have proven
to be functional and beneficial in an area of law in which individuals'
lives are not at stake. It then analogizes proposed legislation with
pending court decisions, and proposes that, since courts grant stays of
executions where there is the potential for changes in substantive case
law, courts should similarly consider granting stays where there is
relevant legislation introduced into Congress to allow for greater
consistency and justice. Part IV further addresses the state's
countervailing interests of federalism and finality and suggests that
considering granting stays where the petitioner stands to potentially
benefit from proposed legislation will not unduly interfere with these
interests. Finally, Part V concludes that considering granting stays of
execution will at least afford defendants the potential opportunity to
18. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
19. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867; see also, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60
(2008); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2868; Medellin, 554 U.S. at 760; Breard, 523 U.S. at 37879.
21. Consular Notification Compliance Act of201 1, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011).
22. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867-68.
23. Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011 § 4(a)(1).
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present a claim that those with later execution dates will potentially have
the ability to present.
II.

How COURTS EVALUATE PETITIONS FOR STAYS OF EXECUTION

Federal courts have jurisdiction to stay the execution of sentences
pursuant to habeas corpus.24 After an individual exhausts state court
remedies,25 the writ of habeas corpus allows that individual to challenge
his or her conviction on constitutional grounds in federal court.26
Accordingly, stay petitions often accompany these post-conviction
appeals in attempts to gain time to litigate and decide the claims.27 The

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide limited guidelines.28
However, courts exercise their discretion when deciding to grant or deny
petitions to stay executions. 29 Although the Supreme Court has held that,

due to its nature, capital punishment is entitled to higher procedural
safeguards than other sentences, 3 0 the discretion granted to courts
continues to result in the application of inconsistent procedures and

24. The jurisdictional grant is clear:
A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is
pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending
appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under
the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (2006).
25. Post-conviction appeal in state court is termed "direct" review. Veilleux, supra note 1, at
2546.
26. Michael Macmanus, Comment, Section 2262(C) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996: Towards the Precipice of Unconstitutionality?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
879, 888-89 (1997); Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2546. Post-conviction appeals in federal court are
referred to as "collateral" review. Id. The doctrine of habeas corpus represents the notion that the
state must have justification to detain an individual. Macmanus, supra, at 886. The Constitution
2.
prohibits suspension of"[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has described writs of habeas corpus as the "highest safeguard of
liberty." Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 322 (1996) (quoting Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708,
712 (1961)).
27. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2546. The need to stay executions is particularly crucial in
capital cases, since executing the sentence renders moot any claim of the death-sentenced
individual. Beverly Bryan Swallows, Comment, Stays of Execution: Equal Justice for All, 45
BAYLOR L. REV. 911,929 (1993).
28. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 38. Specifically, this rule sets forth that courts must grant stays of a
death sentence where "the defendant appeals the conviction or sentence." Id.
29. United States v. Bestway Disposal Corp., 724 F. Supp. 62, 70 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
30. Boaz, supra note 4, at 353 n.19; see also Gailon W. McGowen, Jr., Note, An Opportunity
to Address the Merits: Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 83,

100 (1985).
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results. 3' However, where there is potential for a change in relevant case
law, courts tend to exercise their discretion in favor of the petitioner
in
32
order to give him or her a chance to benefit from the potential law.
A.

The "Standards"

The Supreme Court did attempt to set forth general guidelines for
courts to follow when evaluating petitions to stay the executions of death
sentences in Barefoot v. Estelle.33 There, the Court found it necessary to
establish proper procedure in the interest of "the fair and efficient
consideration" of defendants' habeas corpus appeals.34 The Court left it
to the lower courts to develop the procedure 35 but established that where

3 1. See, e.g., Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2550 (discussing the "informal procedures" and
inconsistency regarding stay decisions); see also, e.g., Edward A. Hartmett, Ties in the Supreme
Court of the UnitedStates, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 676 (2002) (explaining how "a blanket
rule requiring a stay in death penalty cases rather than... case-by-case equitable balancing" is
appropriate due to the irreparable harm that can be caused by the sentence). However, this is not the
only area of law in which broad judicial discretion is problematic. For example, the decision
whether to impose the death penalty lies within the discretion of the sentencers. George Wesley
Sherrell, IV, Note, Successive Chancesfor Life: Kuhlmann v. Wilson, FederalHabeas Corpus,and
the CapitalPetitioner, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 478-79 (1989). Although it is important that such
decisions be made "rationally and according to uniform standards," the Court has struggled to find a
system that guides the imposition of the death penalty. Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a
System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 914 (1982); Sherrell, supra, at 478-79. In 1972, the Court struck down
capital punishment statutes since "the penalty was being imposed without uniformity or reason," but
subsequently upheld statutes that limited the sentencer's discretion and assisted appellate review of
the sentencer's decision. Sherrell, supra, at 478. However, later decisions allowed defendants to
introduce any available mitigating evidence, making it difficult to determine why the jury found the
death sentence to be appropriate on appellate review. Id. at 478-79. While this may have been meant
to assist defendants facing potential death sentences, it interferes with the Court's attempt to make
the sentencing process more certain and uniform. Id. For instance, if the appellate court is uncertain
whether an error that occurred during trial affected the jury's decision, it similarly cannot be certain
whether that decision should be upheld. Id. at 479. Judge Gerald W. Heaney has even held that "the
imposition of the death penalty is arbitrary and capricious," and further that "the decision of who
shall live and who shall die for his crime turns less on the nature of the offense and the
incorrigibility of the offender and more on inappropriate and indefensible considerations." Singleton
v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring); see also Stephen B. Bright,
Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms,
Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1, 9
(expressing disapproval of the capital punishment system).
32. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 285 (1953) (convening a Special
Term of the Court to discuss a grant of a stay of execution pending a lower court's determination of
whether law applied to a specific case); see also Bruhl, supra note 6, at 219 n.48 (2011).
33. 463 U.S. 880, 892-95 (1983).
34. Id. at 892.
35. Id.
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a prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause by "mak[ing] a
'substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right, ' '3 6 the Court
should grant a stay of execution to allow for disposition of the appeal.37
Further, stays may be considered simultaneously with the merits of the
appeal, but must be granted if the time needed to rule on the merits
conflicts with the defendant's impending execution date. 38 With regards
to stays related to successive habeas corpus petitions that present new
issues, the petitioner must demonstrate "substantial grounds upon which
relief might be granted. 3 9 Lastly, stays should be granted if the
petitioner sets forth a reasonable probability that four Justices would find
the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari, a
significant possibility that the lower court's decision will be reversed,
and a40 "likelihood [of] irreparable harm" resulting from a denial of the
stay.
In response to Barefoot, some of the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals promulgated rules that govern the procedure for applying for
stays of execution of death sentences pending appeal. 4 ' However, the
standard under which the courts will consider such petitions has yet to be
codified.42 Further, Barefoot has since been superseded by statute.4 3
While it continues to be cited for various propositions, 44 application of
this standard is inconsistent.4 5 Further, both Congress and the Supreme
Court have yet to establish guidelines regarding the evaluation of stay

36. Id. at 893 (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cit. 1971)). This portion of
the Barefoot inquiry has since been superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which provides that the
defendant must substantially establish the denial of a constitutional, rather than a federal right. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2008); see also United States v. Monroe, 974 F. Supp. 1472, 1475 n.4 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (evaluating motion for certificate of appealability). Nonetheless, the Court noted in
Barefoot that it is proper to consider the nature of a capital sentence when evaluating probable
cause. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893.
37. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893-94.
38. Id. at 894.
39. Id. at 895.
40. Id.
41. McGowen, supranote 30, at 90 (evaluating the effectiveness of the procedures).
42. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. Loc. R. 22(b); 5TH CIR. R. 8(2).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2235(c)(2) (2008).
44. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006); see also Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U.S.
951, 952 (1995) (denying the petitioner's stay for failure to convince four Justices that certiorari
would be granted on underlying claims).
45. Compare Hill, 547 U.S. at 584 (holding that defendants must satisfy the Barefoot
requirements for a stay), with Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (making no mention of
Barefoot or stay requirements).
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petitions where there is no petition for certiorari on the underlying
appeal.46
Although Barefoot could have been a step toward consistent
procedure, there continues to be no uniform method for evaluating
petitions to stay executions of death sentences.47 Sometimes courts
require that a stay of execution be granted only where a substantial
question exists, therefore compelling further proceedings.4 8 Other times
courts find that a consideration of whether the underlying issue has been
fairly litigated trumps an inquiry into substance.49 Still, many times
courts do not consider whether a substantial question exists at all.50
Rather, they analyze petitions to stay executions in accordance with the
four-prong standard used to evaluate preliminary injunctions, 51 since
stays and injunctions similarly provide relief in the form of enjoining
current actions. In such instances, these courts consider whether: (1)
the petitioner "has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;" (2)
the petitioner would "suffer irreparable injury" without issuance of the
stay; (3) issuing the stay would "substantially harm" the other party
and (4) issuing the stay would "be adverse to
involved in the litigation;
53
the public interest.

Sometimes courts apply this four-prong standard in determining
whether a substantial question exists.54 Even still, other courts require
petitioners to show good cause for the court to grant a stay of
execution. 5 For example, in Morales v. Cate,56 the court granted the
46. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2235; Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-96 (1983) (limiting
guidelines to govern stays in which the petitioner has an underlying appeal pending).
47. See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 256-57; see also Boaz, supra note 4, at 358 (noting that the
post-Barefoot procedures "provide no measured or sensible system").
48. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 288-89 (1953) (finding no substantial question
where the Court refuted defendants' claim that the District Court had no jurisdiction to impose the
death sentence); Wheeler v. Reid, 175 F.2d 829, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (finding no substantial
question where defendant did not seek underlying appeal in good faith).
49. Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980).
50. See, e.g., infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
51. DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11 th Cir. 2011).
52. Mulligan v. Zant, 531 F. Supp. 458, 459 (M.D. Ga. 1982) ("[T]he extraordinary remedy
of a stay of execution is equivalent to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and ... similar
considerations apply in the Court's exercise of its discretion.").
53. DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1324; see also Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir.
2011); Workman v. Bell, 484 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 2007); Mulligan, 531 F. Supp. at 459.
54. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708, 710 (5th Cir. 1982) (setting forth guidelines later
to be adopted in Barefoot and finding a substantial question where petitioner alleged that jury
selection violated rules established in U.S. Supreme Court case law).
55. Catlin v. Superior Court, 245 P.3d 860, 866 (Cal. 2011); Tokman v. Terrell, No. 06-0150,
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petitioner's stay since it found "good cause" 57 where the petitioner could
potentially establish that California's method of execution "create[d] a
demonstrated risk of severe pain." 58 Yet, in Tokman v. Terrell,59 where
the petitioner asserted that his execution should be stayed so that the
Supreme Court could evaluate a separate, non-capital judgment, the
court found that the petitioner failed to establish "good cause" to stay his
execution.6 ° Moreover, other times courts grant or deny stays without
specifying any standard 61 or fail to explain the reasons for their decisions
altogether.62
The evaluation procedure not only varies from court to court, but it
is inconsistent within individual courts as well. 63 Further, there seems to
be a trend toward expediting the execution process.64 Thus, a petitioner
seeking full and fair consideration of his or her sentence through a stay
of execution cannot even be sure under which procedure, if any, his or
her stay petition will be evaluated.65

2006 WL 1750671, at *5 (W.D. La. May 2, 2006).
56. No. 5-6-cv-219-JF-HRL, 2010 WL 3835655 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010).
57. Id. at *5.
58. Id. at *4 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. No. 06-0150, 2006 WL 1750671 (W.D. La. May 2, 2006).
60. Id. at *1, *4-5.
61. See e.g., Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868 (2011) (denying stay since claim was
based on "hypothetical legislation"); Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008) (denying stay
where there was no evidence of an unlawfully obtained confession); Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d
155, 156 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying stay where the petitioner failed to present an "issue that jurists of
reason would consider debatable").
62. Revesz & Karlan, supra note 7, at 1074-75; Swallows, supranote 27, at 924 (highlighting
that stay decisions are usually not accompanied by an opinion). For examples of the Court denying
petition for stays of death sentences without providing explanation, see Juniper v. Kelly, 132 S. Ct.
572, 572 (2011), Valle v. Singer, 132 S. Ct. 73, 73 (2011), and Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S.
927, 927 (1985).
63. Compare Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50 (2004) (explaining that courts must
consider "the likelihood of success on the merits [and the] relative harms to the parties, [but also]
the extent to which the" petition was unnecessarily tardy), with Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2
(1983) (denying stay for failure to convince four Justices that certiorari would be granted on
underlying claims, "one of the basic requirements for the issuance of a stay," and failing to make
mention of any consideration of the relative harm to the parties), and Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2866-68
(making no evaluation of relative harm to the parties or time of filing).
64. See Boaz, supra note 4, at 355-56, 358-59 (discussing expedited executions and the
surrounding problems). See generally Veilleux, supra note 1 (discussing and analyzing data
evidencing the overall increase in denied stays of execution).
65. See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 256-57; Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2550.
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B.

Where There Are Potential Changes in Case Law

The procedure that governs potential changes in the law similarly
lacks formal rules. 66 However, the Supreme Court has noted the
importance of adapting to changes in accordance with justice. 67 Thus,
although new law is sometimes applied prospectively, 68 changes in case
law are generally applied retroactively to cases that are pending on
appeal. 69 Further, criminal proceedings allow for collateral attack on
final judgments7 ° and changes in substantive law provide reason for
relief in post-finality collateral proceedings. 7'
The Court has even made it a practice to remand cases for
reconsideration where, in light of new precedent, it becomes unclear
whether the case's disposition should remain the same.72 An underlying
assumption exists in the court system that when the Court makes such a
remand-also referred to as a "GVR" 73-it has decided that the
judgment below is inconsistent, and thus cannot coexist, with the new
precedent.7 4 Therefore, under this assumption, when presented with
these remands, the lower courts are expected to reverse
their decisions,7
76
retroactively.
law
case
new
the
applying
effectively

66. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 218-20.
67. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
Retroactive liability is prohibited in criminal law so that people are on notice of what constitutes
criminal behavior. See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 210; R. Brian Tanner, Comment, A Legislative
Miracle: Revival Prosecutionsand the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 50 EMORY L.J. 397, 416 (2001).
69. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 211 ("Adjudicative retroactivity.., is balanced against values like
finality and repose."). Constitutional principles of criminal procedure also apply retroactively to
cases pending on direct review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304 (1989).
70. Collateral attack is a form of post-conviction relief that is not a direct appeal. Wall v.
Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1284 (2011) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(2) (2008)). Collateral
review provides defendants with a method to make legal challenges to their conviction. See id. at
1283-84, 1287.
71. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 212.
72. See, e.g., Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 776 (1964).
73. "GVR" is an acronym that represents the Court's procedure of granting certiorari,
vacating the lower court's decision, and remanding the case to the lower court for further
consideration. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 217.
74. Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remandsfor Reconsideration
and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, II HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 9-10
(1984).
75. Id. at 8.
76. United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1173 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting that the Court
would not have remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit had it not intended for retroactive
application of the new case law); Hellman, supra note 74, at 20.
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Accordingly, courts have used their discretion to grant petitions to
stay the executions of death sentences where there are pending court
decisions that might affect the outcome of the defendant's sentence.77
For example, in Rosenberg v. United States,78 the two defendants
petitioned the Court to stay their executions, alleging that the Atomic
Energy Act of 194679 superseded the Espionage Act 80 and thus rendered
the District Court without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence. 8' The
Court granted the stay until applicability of the Atomic Energy Act
could be determined in the lower courts.82
Furthermore, the Court typically uses its discretion to grant stay
petitions where the petitioner's underlying claim goes to the same
question to which it has granted certiorari.83 At times, lower courts
follow the precedent of the Supreme Court in granting stays where
certiorari has been granted on a relevant issue.84 For example, in
Chambers v. Bowersox,85 the court granted a stay of execution since the
decision of a pending Supreme Court case could be determinative as to
whether the defendant was entitled to plenary review. 86 Similarly, in
Gardnerv. Florida,87 the court stayed the execution of a capital prisoner
sentenced in Florida pending the Supreme Court's decision regarding the

77. Courts have discretion when there is a potential change in the law-they can stay the case
or fail to act until the issue regarding the change in the law is resolved. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 21819. At times, courts decline to wait for the outcome of the relevant decision, despite the irreparable
harm involved. Id.at 206. However, "the unwillingness of... courts to manage the timing of their
decisions with an eye toward the potential for a forthcoming change of law is incongruous in light
of how courts handle other cases." Id.at 257.
78. 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
79. Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-23.
(2008)).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
81. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 283.
82. Id. at 285. However, the Court subsequently vacated the stay, holding that the question to
be decided during the stay was not substantial since the Atomic Energy Act did not render the
District Court without jurisdiction to impose the death penalty under the Espionage Act. Id.at 28889.
83. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 219 n.48 (citation omitted); see also Hartnett, supra note 31, at
677-78 (arguing that Congress should codify a law providing for the automatic stay of a death
sentence any time the Supreme Court grants a petition for certiorari). But see Veilleux, supra note 1,
at 2550-51.
84. See Bruhl, supranote 6, at 206.
85. 197 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1999).
86. Id.at 309 (finding an "appreciable chance" that the defendant had not received 'the full
review process").
87. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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88
constitutionality of the capital-sentencing procedure in Florida.
Moreover, from 2006 to 2008, several courts granted petitions to stay the
executions of prisoners sentenced to death by89 lethal injection, pending
the Supreme Court's decision in Baze v. Rees.
Therefore, the U.S. court system does not apply a uniform standard
when determining whether to grant or deny petitions to stay the
executions of death sentences. 90 This lack of structure often results in
uncertainty and, at times, injustice. 9 1 However, courts have demonstrated
a trend toward granting petitions to stay executions where there exists
the potential for a change in case law from which the petitioner stands to
benefit.92 Courts should extend this practice to granting stays where
there exists the potential for a change in statutory law.93

III. PREJUDICE EXEMPLIFIED:
DENIAL DESPITE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Although the injustice resulting from courts' broad discretion to
stay the executions of death sentences is demonstrated in numerous
cases, 94 it is particularly apparent in Garciav. Texas.95 Due to the failure
of many states to comply with Article 36 of the VCCR, 96 numerous
foreign nationals 97 arrested in the United States have been prosecuted
88. Id.at 354.
89. 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (reviewing the constitutionality of lethal injection administration
methods); Stays and Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
lethal-injection-stays-granted (last visited July 27, 2012) (discussing stays based on challenges to
the lethal injection process).
90. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2550; see also Boaz, supra note 4, at 359.
91. See, e.g., Boaz, supra note 4, at 354, 359; Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2546, 2557.
92. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 285 (1953) (granting stay pending a
lower court's determination of whether law applied to the petitioners' specific case); Bruhl, supra
note 6, at 219 n.48.
93. See infra Part IV.B.
94. See Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2543 (highlighting various cases in which the Court denied
petitions to stay the execution of death sentences despite evidence implicating the petitioners'
innocence).
95. See generally 131 S.Ct.2866 (2011).
96. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
Under Article 36 of the VCCR, the United States is required to inform detained foreign nationals
"without delay" of the right to communicate with their consulate and to freely allow such
communications. Id.
97. It is difficult to quantify the number of foreign nationals arrested and sentenced to death
since, due to the failure of the United States to provide arrested foreigners with their consular rights,
the "foreign consulates in the United States are likely to remain unaware of the true number of their
nationals who are imprisoned, let alone sentenced to death." Mark Warren, ForeignNationals and
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and sentenced to death without being provided access to the legal
resources of their respective national consulates upon arrest.98 Although
this constitutes a violation of the VCCR, 99 the Supreme Court has held
that such a violation does not constitute grounds to stay the executions of
the sentences in order to afford these convicted individuals a new,
unprejudiced trial. 00
The petition for a stay of execution in Garcia, however, did not
merely allege a VCCR violation.0 1 Rather, it asserted that the execution
should be stayed to allow Garcia the opportunity to benefit from a
potential change in legislation.' 0 2 The Court has previously stayed
executions in light of potential changes in case law, 03 and Garcia set
forth evidence of a strong likelihood of the potential legislative
change. 1°4 However, the majority of the Court, in its discretion, denied
Garcia an opportunity to potentially benefit from a law
that similarly
10 5
situated individuals may benefit from in the near future.
A. Background
Pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR, foreign nationals who are
arrested abroad have a right to communicate with their national
consulate. 0 6 This is beneficial to foreigners because the consulate has
the power to ensure the arrestee has proper legal assistance.10 7 Congress
has recognized the crucial role played by competent counsel in capital

the Death Penalty in the US, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreign-nationals-and-death-penalty-us.
However, an estimated
sixty-six foreigners who were arguably denied their consular rights are currently on death row. Id.
98. Nancy Alexander, Comment, Saved by the States? The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, FederalGovernment Shortcomings, and Oregon 's Rescue, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
819, 822-23 (2011).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2008); Germany v. United States, 526
U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1998).
101. Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
102. Id.
103. Bruhl, supranote 6, at 219 n.48.
104. Supplemental Brief to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1 Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
2866 (2011) (No. 11-5001) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief to the Petition].
105. See generally Garcia, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (denying petition for stay of execution and writ of
habeas corpus).
106. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
107. Alexander, supra note 98, at 823-24; see also Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and
Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1990)
(discussing the importance of competent counsel in capital cases).
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cases by providing for an automatic stay upon the appointment of

adequate counsel in initial post-conviction proceedings.' 0 8 Moreover, in
2001, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that whether a
capital defendant09received competent counsel would be dispositive of his

or her sentence.'
As a party to the VCCR," 0 the United States has an international
obligation to comply with its provisions."' However, the United States
12
has demonstrated a consistent disregard for Article 36 of the VCCR.
As a result, numerous foreign nationals arrested in the United States
have been convicted and sentenced to death without being given access
to the resources of their respective consulates. 13 Many of these
sentenced foreigners have unsuccessfully attempted to preempt their
capital punishment by alleging that their convictions were prejudiced
due to lack of consular access." 4 One such attempt is apparent in
Medellin v. Texas." 5 There, Texas officials arrested a Mexican national
and failed to inform him of his right to communicate with the Mexican
16
consulate pursuant to the VCCR.
Medellin was subsequently
7
death."
to
sentenced
and
convicted
Meanwhile, as a result of the deaths resulting from the consistent
failure of the United States to comply with Article 36 of the VCCR,
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261(c), 2262(a) (2006); see also Hartnett, supra note 31, at 677 (discussing
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a)).
109. "I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-ofexecution stay applications in which the defendant was well represented at trial? People who are
well represented at trial do not get the death penalty." Inadequate Representation, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES

UNION

(Oct.

8,

2003),

http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/inadequate-

representation.
110. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499 (2008) (noting that the United States ratified the
VCCR in 1969); MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32390, VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS 4 (2004) [hereinafter ICJ INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION], available

at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32390.pdf.
111. ICJ INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION, supra note 110, at 1; Alexander,
supra note 98, at 822.
112. ICJ INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION, supra note 110, at 1; Alexander,
supra note 98, at 822-23.
113. Warren, supra note 97.
114. See, e.g., Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (denying motion to
enjoin execution of German national since pleas were tardy); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 37779 (1998) (finding no private cause of action in the VCCR to set aside convictions).
115. 552 U.S. 491,501-04 (2008).
116. Idat500-01.
117. Id.at501.
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Mexico brought a claim against the United States in the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") 118 regarding Medellin and the fifty-one other
foreign nationals on death row who had been denied their consular rights
under the VCCR. 19 The ICJ found that the United States was bound by
its international obligations pursuant to the VCCR.120 As such, it ordered
the United States to reconsider the convictions and sentences of those
foreign nationals awaiting execution. 12 Accordingly, Medellin applied
in state court for a writ of habeas corpus. 22 On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court found that the "the treaties requiring compliance with the
Avena judgment"' 123 were not self-executing, 124 and, therefore, that the
ICJ decision was not binding in the United States absent congressional
action. 125
Medellin then petitioned the Court to stay the execution of his death
sentence, arguing that, should Congress or the state legislature determine
that the ICJ decision should be given controlling weight in U.S.
domestic law, the Court would have jurisdiction over his claim that he
118. The ICJ is an international tribunal that adjudicates disputes between members of the
United Nations Charter. Id.at 497; U.N. Charter art. 92 ("The International Court of Justice shall be
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.").
119. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 15-16, 23 (Mar. 31);
see also Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. 491, 497-98 (2008).
120. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 73.
121. Id. at 73.
122. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498.
123. Id.at 504. Specifically, the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes to the Vienna Convention, the United Nations Charter and the ICJ Statute. Id. at 499, 506
n.4.
124. Treaty obligations do not extend from international law into domestic law absent
congressional action unless the treaty is self-executing. Id. at 504-05. A treaty is self-executing if it
contains provisions that make it operative in the United States. Id.at 505-06.
125. Id. at 506. In 1969, the United States signed the Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 496 U.N.T.S. 487, availableat http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963_disputes.pdf [hereinafter Optional Protocol];
Alexander, supranote 98, at 823. As a party to the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to be
subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ opinions. Optional Protocol, supra; Alexander, supra
note 98, at 823. In response to Medellin's petition to stay his execution, President George W. Bush
issued a Presidential Memorandum declaring that the courts should comply with the Avena
judgment. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Memorandum for the Att'y Gen. (Feb.
28, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050228-18.html; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498. In 2005, the United States withdrew from
the Optional Protocol. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan,
Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/87288.pdf; Alexander, supranote 98, at 823. The Court similarly found the
Presidential Memorandum to be unenforceable in U.S. domestic law. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498-99.
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received a prejudiced trial. 26 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
possibility was "too remote" that either Congress or the Texas legislature
would enact legislation that would make the VCCR violation illegal in
domestic law.' 27 The
Court denied the stay, 28 and Medellin was
29
1
day.
executed that
B. Garcia v. Texas
Garciav. Texas' 30 similarly concerned a foreign national on death
row who did not receive access to his national consulate pursuant to the
VCCR. 13' In Garcia, the federal legislature had taken steps toward the
congressional action necessary to make the Avena decision binding in
U.S. domestic law.' 32 Accordingly, Garcia's stay petition alleged that his
execution should be postponed pending Congress's consideration of the
CNCA, 133 which, if passed, could have the potential to change Garcia's
sentence.1 34 Still, despite the introduction of the CNCA
into Congress,
135
execution.
his
stay
to
petition
Garcia's
denied
the Court

126. Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759 (2008).
127. Id. The Court further noted that it had received no representation from the President or
other officials regarding the likelihood of legislative action. Id. at 759-60.
128. Id. at 760. The Court also found the stay to be inappropriate since Medellin's confession
was not obtained unlawfully and the state court judgment was valid. Id.
129. Id. at 759 (rendering decision on August 5, 2008); David Carson, Jose Medellin, TEX.
EXECUTION INFO. CENTER. (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/410.asp (noting
that Jose Medellin was executed on August 5, 2008).
130. 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011).
131. Id. at 2867. In fact, Garcia is one of the Mexican nationals listed in the Avena case. Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Gov't of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Humberto Leal
Garcia at 1, 10, Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (No. 11-5001) [hereinafter Brief Amicus
Curiae of the United Mexican States]; see also Zoe Tillman, Supreme Court Denies Stay of
Execution for Humberto Leal, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (July 7, 2011,
7:45 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/supreme-court-denies-stay-of-execution-forhumberto-leal.html.
132. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867 (explaining the introduction of legislation in the Senate with
the support of the Executive Branch).
133. Id. at2869.
134. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(1)-(2)
(2011). The Court was aware that the CNCA would likely become enacted legislation prior to the
end of the current congressional session, since the Supplemental Brief to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari set forth that the CNCA had the support of the Obama administration, the endorsement of
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Attorney General Eric Holder, and the commitment of
Senator Leahy to ensure it passed. Supplemental Brief to the Petition, supra note 104, at 1.
135. Garcia,131 S. Ct. at 2867-68.
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The enactment of the CNCA would provide a substantive change to
the law that would go directly to the sentences of Garcia and other
similarly situated foreign nationals. 3 6 Specifically, the CNCA would
provide the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear claims regarding
VCCR violations. 137 Thus, Garcia and other foreign death row prisoners
would be entitled to hearings regarding their allegations that their trials
38
were prejudiced due to the state's failure to comply with the VCCR. 1
The CNCA would also codify the international obligations of the United
States pursuant to the VCCR, 139 therefore placing the claims of future
foreign arrestees alleging failure to be provided
with consular access
40
within the protection of federal court review. 1
C. Garcia'sInjustice
141
Although Garcia alleged that his constitutional due process rights
would be violated if the Court were to deny the stay given that Congress
was currently reviewing the CNCA, 142 the Court, using its discretion,
held that it was not its job to rule on what the law might be and denied

136. See id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Consular Notification Compliance Act of2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2011).
138. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court is no stranger to defendants
petitioning for stays of execution on the basis of prejudiced trials. See Buck v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 69,
69 (2011). In Buck, a case decided approximately two months after Garcia's death, the Court
granted a stay of execution pending its decision to review whether the defendant received a
prejudiced trial. Id.; David Carson, Humberto Leal, TEX. EXECUTION INFO. CENTER. (July 8, 2011)
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/471.asp (identifying Humberto Leal Garcia's execution as
taking place on July 7, 2011); Ariane de Vogue, After Stay of Execution in Texas, Ginsburg
Discusses Death Penalty, Perry 'Respects' Court Decision, ABC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011, 1:59 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/after-stay-of-execution-in-texas-ginsburg-discussesdeath-penalty-perry-has-no-comment (discussing the Court's decision in Buck).
139. Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011)
(providing that arresting officials are to immediately inform arrested foreign nationals of their right
to communicate with their consulate and immediately make the consulate accessible upon the
arrestee's request).
140. Id. at § 4(a)(1).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). It is established law that a defendant's
sentencing process and trial must comply with the requirements of Due Process. Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Accordingly, in Gardner,the Court vacated defendant's death sentence
since defendant was denied access to information in a pre-sentence investigation report. Id. at 351,
362. The Court found that this constituted a violation of defendant's due process rights since the
lower court denied defendant an opportunity to explain or deny the information that it relied on in
sentencing defendant to death. Id. at 362.
142. Garcia,131 S. Ct. at 2867.
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the petition. 143 Garcia was executed that evening. 144 Evinced by the 5-4
split 45 and passionate dissent, t46 the denial of Garcia's petition for a stay
demonstrates that whether he would have received one more chance to
challenge his sentence47depended more on the discretion of the Justices
than on the law itself.1
48
Due to the risk of irreparable harm inherent in capital sentences, 49
it is important that each capital defendant's sentence is fully evaluated
and based on individualized reason. 150 Some states even have automatic
appeal statutes in which either the clerk or trial judge, immediately after
sentencing a defendant to death, is to enter an appeal of the sentence on
behalf of the defendant.' 5' Pursuant to these statutes, defendants are
afforded stays of execution upon the automatic entering, and for the
duration of, these initial appeals. 5 2 Further, in Evans v. Bennett,153 the
Supreme Court granted a stay of execution simply because the defendant

143. Id. at 2867-68.
144. See id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Garcia's execution would take place on
the evening of July 7, 2011); Carson, supra note 138 (confirming that Garcia was executed on July
7,2011).
145. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2868.
146. See id. at 2868-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted:
In reaching its... conclusion, the Court... substitutes its own views about the
likelihood of congressional action for the views of Executive Branch officials who have
consulted with Members of Congress, and it denies the request by four Members of the
Court to delay the execution until the Court can discuss the matter.
Id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 629 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining how broad judicial discretion often results in decisions
that demonstrate the personal views of the judges rather than the law). In fact, in general, the law of
legal change as a system is largely up to the discretion of the courts. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 218-19.
148. See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 256; see also LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 487
(June 27) (recognizing the irreparable and imminent prejudice inherent in capital cases); Hartnett,
supranote 31, at 676 ("Everyone agrees that death constitutes irreparable harm .... ").
149. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d
487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980)) (explaining that courts must be especially certain in capital cases "that the
legal issues 'have been sufficiently litigated,' and the criminal defendant accorded all the
protections guaranteed him by the Constitution")); McGowen, supra note 30, at 101.
150. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (explaining that death sentences should not
be based on "caprice or emotion"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (2006) (noting that appeals of death
sentence convictions should take precedence over all other cases).
151. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-22-150 (2006); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.2 (2011); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1239 (West 2004); GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-35 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.055 (West 2000).
152. See, e.g.,supra note 151.
153. 440 U.S. 1301 (1979).
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was facing the death penalty.154 The Court acknowledged that the
defendant had received full review of his conviction and sentence 55 and
that the petitioner' 56 filed for the stay of execution against the
defendant's will. 15 7 Still, "because of the obviously irreversible nature of
the death penalty," the
Court "d[id] not feel justified in denying the stay
15 8
assumption."
that
on
The Court has even noted the importance of reviewing "capitalsentencing procedures against evolving standards of procedural fairness
in a civilized society."' 159 This proved to be important in Gardner v.
Florida60 where the Court, after staying the petitioner's death sentence
and granting certiorari, found that the petitioner had been denied due
process of law during sentencing. Were the petitioner not afforded the
chance to litigate his due process claim, the Court likely would not have
vacated his death sentence. 62 Moreover, in Shaw v. Martin,163 the court
stayed the petitioner's death sentence to ensure that he was afforded his
post-conviction procedural rights. 64 There, the court found that it was
necessary to grant the stay in order to ensure that "the legal issues ha[d]
been sufficiently litigated and relitigated,"1 65 and that the petitioner had
received all the protections to which he or she was constitutionally
entitled. 166 Further, appellate review proved important in Schlup v.
Delo167 where the Supreme Court found a man facing the death penalty
to be innocent.1 68 Had the Court declined to hear the petitioner's claim
on appeal, he would have been executed despite his potential
154. Id. at 1306.
155.

Id.

156. The petitioner in this case was the mother of the capital defendant. Id.at 1301.
157. The defendant plead guilty to robbery-murder, requested the death penalty, refused to
participate in the appeals and petitions on his behalf, and "repeatedly expressed his desire to die."
Id.at 1301-02.
158. The assumption being that "because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the
Alabama Supreme Court have fully reviewed Evans' conviction and sentence" a denial of a stay of
execution would be appropriate. Id.at 1306.
159. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
160. 430 U.S. 349.
161. Id.at 354, 362.
162. See id.
at 362.
163. 613 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1980).
164. Id.at 492-93.
165. Id. at 491,493 (quoting Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
166. Id.at 491 (citing Evans, 440 U.S. at 1303).
167. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
168. Id. at301,332.
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innocence. 169 Thus, it is of particular importance that courts grant stays
of execution70 where a petitioner has a claim that can affect his or her
conviction.
Some courts are of the opinion that the carrying out of the death
sentence alone does not constitute irreparable harm. 17' Nevertheless,
72
timing is crucial to the ultimate outcome of these types of cases.1
Capital defendants should be afforded the opportunity to litigate viable
claims during their lifetime. 7 3 Denying stays of execution in capital
cases effectively renders any viable claims moot and "undermines the
very legitimacy of capital punishment as a system."'' 74 Accordingly, in
o 'Bryan v. Estelle,175 the court granted the petitioner's stay of his death
sentence77 to ensure that the petitioner's claims 176 received adequate
review. 1
Further, in Teague v. Lane, 178 the Supreme Court emphasized the
inequity that would result from the disparate treatment of defendants. 179
Specifically, "once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case
announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied
retroactively to all who are similarly situated."' 80 Therefore, in Garcia,
169. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 323-25 (holding that "[tihe quintessential miscarriage ofjustice is
the execution of a person who is entirely innocent"); Macmanus, supra note 26, at 881-82, 892.
170. See Macmanus, supra note 26, at 889, 892; see also Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 26 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of
reconsideration of a decision where an "intervening decision has shed new light on the law which, if
it had been available at the time of the [lower court's] decision, might have led to a different
result").
171. Mulligan v. Zant, 531 F. Supp. 458, 460 (M.D. Ga. 1982). But see Swallows, supra note
27, at 926 (discussing the "irreparable harm" caused by failure to stay executions since death is
"irrevocable").
172. See Bruhl, supranote 6, at 213-14, 218.
173. Macmanus, supra note 26, at 898-99 (arguing that denying convicted individuals an
opportunity for Supreme Court review and adjudication is unconstitutional on due process grounds);
see also Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 1980) (granting stay so that related issues
pending in various lower courts would not become moot due to the petitioner's execution). ,
174. Swallows, supra note 27, at 929-30 (noting that rendering a case moot by failure to stay
an execution constitutes irreparable harm).
175. 691 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1982).
176. The court found that the petitioner's underlying claims deserved review since at least one
of the claims presented a "substantial question." Id. at 708.
177. Id.
178. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
179. Id. at 302-03, 315 (1989) (rejecting a "standard [which] led to the disparate treatment of
similarly situated defendants").
180. Id. at 300 (emphasis added). "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301 (emphasis
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the denial of the defendant's petition to stay his execution is
comparatively unjust since it stripped him of an opportunity to be aided
by the CNCA, which if enacted, will likely help other similarly situated
individuals in the future.' 81
The Court has consistently declined to consider the states' failure to
comply with the VCCR 182 as grounds to stay the execution of death
sentences, since such actions are violations of international, but not
domestic, law. 183 Even in the face of proposed legislation that would
make such violations illegal in the United States, the Court, in its
184
discretion, has declined to stay the execution of a death sentence.
Although courts have previously recognized the importance of full
review of viable claims in the capital context,' 85 the Court stripped
Garcia of a potential opportunity to litigate a viable claim. 186 In addition
to causing Garcia injustice, the Court's exercise of discretion to deny the
petition for a stay of execution will likely pose serious diplomatic
consequences for the United States. 187

omitted).
181. Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2870 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Hellman,
supra note 74, at 31 (noting the importance of the retroactive application of case law to prevent the
deprivation of "at least one litigant of the benefit of a new rule of law solely by reason of an
accident of timing"); Macmanus, supra note 26, at 892 (discussing the importance of granting stays
so that defendants are not deprived of claims that can potentially aid them); Swallows, supra note
27, at 926-27 (discussing how the execution of a petitioner with claims that may potentially be
found in the petitioner's favor denies the court an opportunity to grant equitable relief).
182. Alexander, supranote 98, at 822-23.
183. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505-06 (2008).
184. Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867-68 (2011).
185. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706,
708 (5th Cir. 1982).
186. Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the execution would place the United States
in breach of its international obligations and thus cause irreparable harm to international relations,
as well as hinder American citizens that are arrested abroad from receiving their consular rights);
see also Alexander, supra note 98, at 825-26 (discussing that "[t]he United States has a strong
interest in complying with its Article 36 obligations in order to maintain international integrity and
to protect its citizens abroad"). Mexico even filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Garcia, noting
that the Court's failure to grant the stay "would seriously jeopardize the ability of the Government
of Mexico to continue working collaboratively with the United States on a number of joint
ventures." Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States, supra note 131, at 23, 51 a (quoting
Letter from Arturo Sarukhan, Ambassador of Mex., to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State (June 14,
2011) (appended at page 49a of BriefAmicus Curiaeof the United Mexican States).
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IV.

EXECUTING EQUITY

A STEP TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM SYSTEM OF EVALUATION

To preserve the equitable nature of stays of execution, a certain
amount of discretion must, and should, be left to the courts. 188 However,
some of the inconsistent and seemingly unjust consequences of such
broad discretion will be minimized if courts are provided with at least
some universal considerations to which they can apply their
discretion.' 89 Specifically, courts should extend their practice of granting
stays where there is a pending court decision to include granting stays
where there is a pending bill in Congress.190 The concrete guidelines that
govern stays in other areas of the law have proven to be functional and
beneficial for both the court system and parties involved.' 91 Moreover,
given the final and irreparable nature of the death penalty, 192 including
the existence of relevant proposed legislation in an equitable evaluation
will not violate the judicial
process or unduly interfere with the state's
93
1
interests.
countervailing
A. Reducing the Courts'Discretion:
An Example of FunctionalGuidelines Surrounding Stays in Federal
Bankruptcy Law
The codification of strict guidelines regarding stays has presented a
fair and functional system in Federal Bankruptcy Law. 194 Pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code,' 95 the debtor's estate is automatically stayed upon the

188. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of ConstitutionalRemedies, 27 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 259, 293 (2009) (noting that "equitable concerns guide [courts'] decision[s] of
whether or not to issue a stay delaying an execution"); Swallows, supra note 27, at 926-27
(discussing the flexibility and discretion necessary for equitable relief); see also Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
189. Boaz, supra note 4, at 354 ("The Court's numerous and varied holdings established that
the unique constitutional status of the death penalty requires strict adherence to the principle of
fairness and reliability in the procedures that inform death sentencing."); Swallows, supra note 27,
at 922-23 (discussing how consistency and predictability is "the key" to the fair imposition of
sentences, which is particularly important for capital sentences).
190. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 258 (proposing a rule in which lower courts should automatically
stay executions in light of potential changes in the law, particularly those exemplified by the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, to promote equity).
191. See infra Part IV.A.
192. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
193. See infra Part IV.C-D.
194.

LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 801,

805 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
195. II U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
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filing of the bankruptcy proceedings. 91 6 Although there are exceptions,197
the statute suspends all pending proceedings and prohibits the
commencement of any new proceedings. 9 ' Accordingly, the stay
prevents the debtor from incurring any additional debt and provides the
trustee with sufficient time to evaluate the debtor's estate and assess the
claims of the creditors. 99 While the purpose of the automatic stay is to
protect the debtor,2 °0 the law also provides guidelines as to when the stay
is terminated 20 ' and allows the creditors to move to vacate the stay so
that they are not unjustly prevented from receiving money to which they
are legally entitled.20 2 These guidelines leave little discretion to the
20 4
courts2 3 and have resulted in a beneficial, "efficient[,] and orderly,,
system.205

Since the law strictly regulates stays in order to protect an
individual's assets,20 6 it would not be inconsistent to allow at least some
regulation in proceedings where an individual's life-as opposed to his
207
While courts need not necessarily stay
or her assets-is at risk.
executions automatically upon a death row inmate's application,20 8 the
system will function more equitably if courts considered uniform factors,
with a universal understanding as to how much weight should be applied
to each.2°9 Specifically, to ameliorate some of the current injustice and
196. Id. at § 362(a). This is true regardless of whether the debtor or creditor initiates the
proceedings. Id.
197. For example, various criminal and family proceedings will not be stayed. Id. at § 362(b).
198. Id.at § 362(a)(1).
199. See Van C. Durrer, 11& Kimberly D. Jaimez, Competing Bankruptcies: What Defenses
Oct. 2011, at 52, 53 (referring to § 362(a) of the
Survive the Automatic Stay?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Bankruptcy Code, noting that "its two-fold purpose is to afford the debtor a 'breathing spell' and to
facilitate an orderly resolution of all claims") (quoting In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 214, 219 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
200. Id.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).
202. Id.at § 362(d); LOPUCKI ET AL., supranote 194, at 807.
203. See generally LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 194 (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's strict
regulation of the automatic stay).
204. Susan Power Johnston, 2009 Developments in Chapter15 Jurisdiction,2010 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L., 1192.
205. See Brian Rothschild, The Illogic of No Limits on Bankruptcy, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
473, 486 (2007) (discussing the benefits of bankruptcy's automatic stay).
206. See supranotes 195-205 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
208. See Mulligan v. Zant, 531 F. Supp. 458, 460 (M.D. Ga. 1982). The countervailing state
interests in denying stays of execution are discussed infra Part IV.D.
209. See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 217-20 (discussing consistency problems resulting from the
great degree of discretionary control courts have over stays of executions).
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variance resulting from the courts' broad discretion, 210 courts should
extend their practice of granting stays where there is a relevant court
decision pending to further grant stays where there is a relevant bill
pending in Congress. 1
B. Pendency of Court Decisions and ProposedLegislation
In the context of granting stays of execution in capital cases,
proposed legislation is analogous to pending court decisions because
both signal the potential for a change in the law.2t2 Changes in the law
can be either substantive 1 3 or procedural. 1 4 Accordingly, both the
legislature and the judiciary have the authority to change what conduct is
deemed criminal and what consequences may be imposed for such
behavior. 1 5 Both can create and remove areas over which courts have
jurisdiction,1 6 provide parties with new causes of action,2 17 and change
the way courts evaluate claims.21 8
Legislative and judicial changes to the U.S. legal system are far
from uncommon. 2 19 Such changes can be disruptive. 220 Therefore, it is
important to "have a set of doctrines and institutional practices that
govern the implementation of these changes. 2 21 Since both proposed
legislation and pending court decisions have the potential to change the
210. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
211. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 258 (proposing a rule in which lower courts should automatically
stay executions in light of potential changes in the law, particularly those exemplified by the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, to prevent clutter in the Court's docket, and to promote equity).
212. See id.at 207. "[E]vents... such as the mere filing of a petition for certiorari, the
issuance of a concurring opinion in which a Justice deems a precedent ripe for reconsideration, or
even the fact that a new Justice has been appointed" can also evince a potential change in the law.
Id.
213. Substantive changes affect the rights, obligations, and private interests of the parties to
which the law applies. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
214. Procedural changes affect the steps that must be taken in compliance with the law, as well
as the rules that govern the law. See Barry Kamins, 2007 Criminal Law Legislation, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Feb. 2008, at 35, 36 (discussing procedural changes accompanying new criminal law).
215. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 208.
216. See, e.g., Kamins, supra note 214, at 37; see also Bruhl, supranote 6, at 218-20.
217. See Ian C. Ballon, Internet Security Law and Litigation 2007: An Overview of FTC
Enforcement Actions and Class Action Litigation, 903 PRAC. L. INST. 207, 212 (2007) (discussing
new claims created by statutes); supranotes 136-40 and accompanying text.
218. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-95 (1983) (setting forth a standard of review
for stays of execution of death sentences); Kamins, supra note 214, at 36.
219. Bruhl, supranote 6, at 208-09.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 209.
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law in crucial ways,"' equity requires that courts not distinguish
between them when the prospective change is relevant to a petition to
stay the execution of a death sentence. 223
Accordingly, when deciding whether to grant or deny stays of
execution, courts should include in their equitable consideration the
existence of proposed legislation that has the potential to affect the
petitioner's death sentence, just as they do when a relevant decision is
pending in the courts.2 24 If such legislation exists, courts should further
inquire as to how long the bill has been pending in Congress 225 and the
likelihood of Congress passing the bill.226 Factors such as express
endorsements from members of the House of Representatives and/or the
228
Senate 227 and the number of steps through which the bill has passed
will demonstrate the likelihood of the bill passing. 229 Furthermore, the
more relevant the prospective law is to the petitioner's conviction, the
more weight its potential enactment should be given in an equitable
evaluation.23 °

222. Id. at 208-09.
223. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. But see Bruhl, supra note 6, at 248
(explaining how the timing of legislative changes are less predictable than the new decisions). The
state's interest in expediting the execution process is discussed infra Part IV.D.
224. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
225. Courts should consider how long a bill has been pending in Congress so as not to unduly
interfere with the state's interest in an expeditious process, which is discussed in detail infra Part
IV.D.2.
226. See Supplemental Brief to the Petition, supra note 104, at 1 (asserting that the Court
should grant the petitioner's stay of execution since there is a strong likelihood that the bill will
become law in the near future).
227. In the case of state law, the endorsements of local legislatures should be considered. See
id. (emphasizing the express endorsements of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Attorney
General Eric Holder, as well as the commitment of Senator Leahy). Support from members of both
branches of Congress is stronger than a unitary endorsement. See Ashley N. Parker, Comment,
Problem Patents: Is Reexamination Truly a Viable Alternative to Litigation?, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
305, 326 n. 105 (2002) (noting that "strong bi-partisan support" demonstrates a "good likelihood" of
a bill becoming law).
228. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the steps through which a bill must pass
in order to become a law).
229. "The likelihood that a bill will become law [further] increases with the number of special
procedures and practices employed [by Congress]." BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 223 (2d ed. 2000). Such

special procedures and practices include, inter alia, consideration by multiple committees and
subsequent adjustments. Id.
230. See supra Part l.B. and text accompanying notes 132-41.
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C. ConsideringRelevant ProposedLegislation Will Not Violate
Courts' Authority
Staying executions while Congress is considering relevant potential
legislation is consistent with judicial authority. 231' For one, the Supreme

Court has extended the application of judicial power to prospective
law, 232 and in Federal Trade Communication v. Dean Foods

Co.,233 it

held that the All Writs Act 234 applied to "the potentialjurisdictionof the
appellate court., 235 Further, courts have found it appropriate to exercise
their discretion in favor of granting stays where the petitioner can
establish that he or she can offer evidence of claims not yet presented. 36
As in Garcia, the enactment of new legislation will at times provide
petitioners with novel claims that they previously did not have the
opportunity to bring.23 7 It follows, therefore, that courts should preserve
their recognized "potential jurisdiction ' 238 by considering staying
executions so that petitioners can be afforded a chance to receive the
benefit of the prospective law and any new claims that it may provide
before they die.239

Moreover, the law recognizes the importance in revising even final
judgments when faced with a change in the law. 240 The judicial system
greatly values the finality of judgments; 24 1 and still, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly grant federal courts discretion to vacate a
final judgment that was "based on an earlier judgment that has been
231. See Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2870 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 600-01 (1966); see also
Garcia, 131 S.Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the petitioner's execution should be
stayed in light of, inter alia, proposed legislation).
233. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). This Act provides, in relevant part, that courts "may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." Id.
235. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 384 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added). The Court held that the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction where it would preserve the status quo
pending the determination of the legality of a merger. Id. at 599, 605.
236. See Rosenberg v. U.S., 346 U.S. 273, 287 (1953) (granting stay where the defendants'
petition contained a claim not yet considered). Part IV.D.4, infra, discusses the statutory limitations
imposed on petitioners that attempt to raise new claims in federal court via successive writs of
habeas corpus.
237. See supra Part III.B.
238. See supra note 232-35 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
240. See FED. R. Ctv. PROC. 60(b)(5H6); Bruhl, supra note 6, at 212.
241. The interest in finality is discussed infra Part IV.D.2.
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reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or... any other reason that justifies relief., 242 Additionally, courts may
reverse decisions that "affected the defendant's substantial rights,
and... the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
proceedings, 2 43 and opportunities for revising judgments are much more
limited in the civil than the criminal context. 2 "
Furthermore, due to the irreversible nature of the death sentence,
capital cases require exceptionally high procedural safeguards. 245 "[T]he
greater the interest at stake, the greater the procedural protection that
must be afforded to the individual in order to insure that the government
does not act in an arbitrary manner. '' 246 Moreover, "[i]n capital cases,
direct review is not an adequate safeguard against miscarriages of
justice,' ' 24 7 and states are required to consider any factors offered by the
24
defense that can mitigate the sentence. 24 Thus, courts' decisions to
expedite the execution of death sentences rather than take extra
precautions to ensure that the individuals facing capital punishment are
rightfully sentenced pose a great risk of irreversible error.249
Finally, in Teague v. Lane,25 ° the Supreme Court found that it is
crucial to retroactively apply new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure. 25 1 Although the Court restricted its holding to cases on direct
review,252 it set forth exceptions to which new rules should apply
retroactively, even to cases being reviewed collaterally. 253 Specifically,

242. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(b)(5)-(6).
243. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 213 (citing FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b)).
244. Id. at211-12.
245. "In a capital case, we must be particularly certain that the legal issues 'have been
sufficiently litigated,' and the criminal defendant accorded all the protections guaranteed him by the
Constitution of the United States." O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980)).
246. Macmanus, supra note 26, at 898 (emphasis added) (explaining the test for determining
procedural due process rights due to an individual, as set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976)).
247. Murphy, supra note 8 (arguing that federal courts "have weakened their independent
authority" by giving great deference to the states in capital cases).
248. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
249. See infra notes 317-27 and accompanying text.
250. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
251. Id. at 304-05. "'[Flailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication."' Id. at 304 (quoting
Griffith v. Kentucky, 470 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
252. Id.at310-11.
253. Id. at 311.
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the Court provided for the retroactive application of new rules that
implicate "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, 2 54 and that
require "procedures that.., are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' 25 5 Most importantly, however, the Court explicitly declined to
express 6 any views as to the restrictions on retroactivity in capital
cases.

25

D. States andSentencing: Balancing the Interests
The state has various interests in the denial of petitions to stay the
execution of the sentences that it imposes. 7 It is entirely within the
258
courts' discretion to decide how much weight to give these interests.
As a result, courts often rely on the state's countervailing interestsparticularly those of federalism and finality 259-when deciding to deny
petitions to stay the execution of death sentences.2 60 While these
legitimate state interests certainly deserve consideration in an equitable
determination,2 6' giving them disproportionate weight poses a risk of
irreversible error262 and at times prevents the viable claims of deathsentenced individuals from being heard.263 Further, the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA")264 is in place to
ensure that the state's interests are maintained where the petitioner seeks

254. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
255. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Mackey v. United States 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971)).
256. Id. at 314 n.2 ("Because petitioner is not under sentence of death, we need not, and do not,
express any views as to how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the
capitalsentencing context.") (emphasis added).
257. For instance, renewed litigation imposes financial burdens on the courts. Berger, supra
note 188, at 294. Relitigating claims is expensive, since it requires the expenditure of costs already
concentrated at trial, as well as any additional expenses. Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo: In re
Davis and the Future of Herrera Innocence Claims in FederalHabeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 629, 649 (2011).
258. See Berger, supranote 188, at 294-95.
259. The state's interests in federalism and finality are discussed infra Part IV.D. 1-2.
260. See Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2556, 2560 (discussing a trend toward denying stays of
execution).
261. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50 (2004); Berger, supra note 188, at 293-95;
Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568.
262. See Boaz, supranote 4, at 358-59.
263. Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2545 ("When a stay is denied, although the state's interest may
be vindicated, the constitutional claim of the petitioner is silenced.").
264. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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collateral relief in federal court through a writ of habeas corpus. 2 65 Thus,
considering relevant proposed legislation as a factor when deciding
will not unduly interfere
whether to grant or deny a stay of execution
266
with the state's countervailing interests.

1. The Interests of Federalism and Comity
The federal reexamination of state convictions raises legitimate
concerns regarding federalism and comity. 267 The United States has a
federalist form of government in which the states maintain authority
over all areas of law that are not expressly granted to the federal
government by the Constitution. 268 The Framers of the Constitution
instituted such a system in order to create a strong central government
while preserving state sovereignty. 269 Criminal law is among those areas
of law that remains within the authority of the states. 27 ° Accordingly,
"staying the hand of state justice is no small matter." 271 Further, the
doctrine of comity provides for the respectful recognition of the
judgments of other tribunals.27 2 It therefore follows that respect for the

265.

Callahan, supra note 257, at 646, 650; Macmanus, supra note 26, at 895; Veilleux, supra

note 1, at 2567-68.
266.

See Boaz, supra note 4, at 358 ("[T]he state does not suffer unduly if the rare frivolous

appeal lasts several months instead of being disposed of in a matter of days or hours.").
267.

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) ("Reexamination of state convictions on

federal habeas frustrate[s] ... both the States sovereign power to punish offenders and their goodfaith attemps to honor constitutional rights." (omission in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568.
268. See, e.g., LARRY K. GAINES & ROGER LEROY MILLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ACTION 11
(Michelle Julet ed., 6th ed. 2011), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Fsqkl2g4VMC&
printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:VKmJ iOV4C&hl=en&sa=X&ei=JNQaTymNsbrOgGYkeGsCw
Federalism,
&ved=0CDQQuwUwAA#v-onepage&q=editions%3A-VKmJ1-iOV4C&f-false;

USLEGAL, http://system.uslegal.com/federalism/ (last visited July 27, 2012).
269. GAINES & MILLER, supra note 268, at 11-12. The preservation of state sovereignty was
very important since the states feared the strong central government would become too powerful,

perhaps even tyrannical. Id.
270.
271.

Id.at 12.
Rodriguez v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1307, 1307-08 (1995) (denying stay since the execution

date would not interfere with "the orderly processing of a petition on direct review"); see also Lee
Kovarsky, AEDPA 's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REv. 443, 456 (2007)

("[A]n interest in comity arises when a criminal judgment of a state court of competent jurisdiction
becomes final.").
272.

Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 456. The Constitution provides that states give "Full Faith

and Credit .. . [to the] judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. Further,
"every court within the United States" is required to give "the same full faith and credit," to the
judicial proceedings of any state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006); see also Kovarsky, supra note 271,

at 456 (explaining comity and federalism).
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dual system of government requires that state courts be afforded "the
first opportunity to decide a petitioner's claims, ' '273
as well as "an
274
opportunity to... correct a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, there exists a presumption that state courts are
competent to impose criminal sentences. 275 It is true that the federal
habeas statute grants the federal courts jurisdiction to stay state court
proceedings.2 76 However, "[fjederal courts are not forums in which to
relitigate state trials," 277 and the state has a right to have the sentences
that it imposes be promptly executed.2 78 Accordingly, "equity must be
sensitive to the State's strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments
without undue interference from the federal courts., 2 79 Therefore, an
equitable consideration by the federal courts understandably28 ° includes
concerns regarding the preservation of federalism and comity.
2. The Interests of Finality and Avoiding Abusive Delay
Judgments typically become final upon either the exhaustion of
remedies under direct review or the expiration of time allotted to bring
an appeal. 28 1 Finality2 82 is necessary for the proper functioning of a
criminal justice system.283 For instance, finality helps ensure that
273. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19
(1982)).
274. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
275. See Berger, supra note 188, at 294 (discussing the political costs imposed on the states as
a result of delays of executions "resulting from the inability to execute a lawfully-imposed
sentence"); see also Callahan, supra note 257, at 649 (noting that reviewing claims already litigated
in state court "disregard[s] the time and expense already undertaken by the deciding state in
rendering its verdict"); Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568 (discussing the importance of respecting "the
integrity of state court decisions").
276. 28 U.S.C § 2251 (2006); Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568.
277. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); see also Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568
(discussing the importance of preserving federalism).
278. Boaz, supranote 4, at 355.
279. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
280. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004) (citing Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for
N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 652, 654 (1992) (per curiam)); Berger, supra note 188, at 293-94;
Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2568.
281. Erin Simmons, Comment, Challenging an Execution After Prolonged Confinement on
Death Row [Lackey Revisited], 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1249, 1263 (2009).
282. Finality represents the notion that judgments are final, effectively concluding the direct
litigation. Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 454.
283. Callahan, supra note 257, at 648; Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2560; see also McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (finding "[o]ne of the law's very objects is the finality of its
judgments").
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criminal punishment has a deterrent effect.2 84 Further, the state has a
legitimate interest in the efficient execution of the sentences that it
imposes. 285 Litigation certainly cannot go on forever, 28 6 and "[b]oth the
individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring
that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to
litigation. ,,21718Accordingly, in Bible v. Schriro,28 8 the court held that
granting a stay would cause hardship to the state since the case had
already been going on for more than two decades.289
Additionally, many courts presume that death row inmates petition
for stays solely to postpone the execution of their death sentences.290
This is particularly true where inmates petition to have their executions
stayed on a date close to that of their impending execution.29' Such "lastminute" petitions are often viewed as attempts to abuse and manipulate
the judicial process.292 Accordingly, these courts consider any
unnecessary delay in bringing the claim, 293 as well95 as the delay that the
stay will cause 294 in their equitable determination.

284. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). The Court has established that the death
penalty is constitutional and represents the notions of deterrence and retribution in Gregg v.
Georgia,428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). See Callahan, supra note 257, at 652.
285. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S.
538, 556 (1998)); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50 (2004); see also Berger, supra note
188, at 293 (discussing controversy with courts' interference with states' interest in the expeditious
execution of death sentences).
286. Kovarsky, supranote 271, at 454.
287. Callahan, supra note 257, at 649 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
288. 651 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).
289. Id. at 1066.
290. Berger, supra note 188, at 293-94; Boaz, supra note 4, at 352.
291. Berger, supra note 188, at 293-94.
292. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004) (quoting Gomez v. United States Dist.
Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Berger, supra note 188, at 293-94; Boaz,supra note 4, at 356.
293. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649 ("A court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to
stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief." (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
294. It can take years to resolve the underlying claim. Ty Alper, Blind Dates: When Should the
Statute of Limitations Begin to Run on a Method-of-Execution Challenge?, 60 DUKE L.J. 865, 887
(2011).
295. Berger, supra note 188, at 294.
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3. Disproportionate Weight and Risk of Error
State interests often compete with those of justice.296 Since there are
no set guidelines as to how to balance these legitimate interests, courts,
in their discretion, often give more weight to the state's interests and
deny petitions to stay executions. 297 For instance, there seems to be a
trend toward deferring to the state courts in order to preserve federalism,
even where the petitioner has a viable constitutional claim. 298 State
interests certainly deserve consideration. However, it would not unduly
burden the courts to consider them more proportionately against interests
that serve justice, such as the availability of relevant prospective
legislation.299 It has been noted that:
The irreversible nature of the death penalty must be weighed against
the fact that "[t]here must come a time, even when so irreversible a
penalty as that of death has been imposed upon a particular defendant,
that the legal issues in the case have been sufficiently litigated and
"300
relitigated so that the law must be allowed to run its course ....
Still, it is particularly important in capital cases to ensure that "the
legal issues 'have been sufficiently litigated,' and the criminal defendant
accorded all the protections guaranteed him by the Constitution of the
United States., 30 1 Not only do "American common law and the
legislative history of habeas corpus reflect adherence to the notion that
concerns for the constitutionality of convictions and detentions should
supersede principles of finality, ' 30 2 but finality is "an interest that is
wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing context. 30 3 Further,
"finality is not affected by the fact that . . . [the petitioner] has...
obtained a stay. ' 3°4 Therefore, in O'Bryan v. Estelle,30 5 even though the
296. Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 454; see also Bright, supra note 31, at 10 (noting that courts
have chosen the goal of finality over those of "fairness and reliability" (quoting People v. Bull, 705
N.E.2d 824, 847 (Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Murphy,
supra note 8, at 52 (discussing the Court's difficulty in balancing the interests of "prompt
enforcement of the death penalty" and "careful and judicious review of the sentence").
297. See Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2556.
298. See id. at 2556-58.
299. See infra notes 309-31 and accompanying text.
300. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S.
1301, 1303 (1979)).
301. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980)).
302. Sherrell, supra note 31, at 456.
303. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 321 n.3 (1989) (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
304. Edward D. Cavanagh, Issue Preclusion in Complex Litigation, 29 REV. LITIG. 859, 875
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case had been "drawn out, '30 6 the court used its discretion to stay the
execution of the petitioner's death sentence to allow for "adequate
review" 3 of his claims.

Denying stays in the interest of preventing potentially unwarranted
delays can prohibit petitioners from bringing claims to which they are
constitutionally entitled.30 9 For example, since the method of execution
for death-sentenced individuals is not made known far in advance,310
311
inmates that petition for stays to challenge their method of execution
necessarily must bring their claim at a time close to the scheduled
execution. 31 z Thus, although hearing these claims would cause a delay,
' 313
giving disproportionate weight to the delay and the "last-minute
nature of the claim can preclude sentenced individuals from receiving
their constitutional right to protection against dangerous methods of
execution. 31 4 Furthermore, "instructing prisoners to file premature
claims ... does not conserve judicial resources, 'reduc[e] piecemeal
litigation,' or 'streamlin[e] federal habeas proceedings.' 3 5 Therefore, it
is questionable why some courts consider "delaying an execution ...an
exceptional evil... [,particularly] when the propriety of the judgment is
in question. 316
Giving disproportionate weight to the state's interests poses a great
risk of error.317 For example, since there are no existing guidelines as to
how much weight courts should give to the delay factor,318 courts often
(2010).
305.
306.
307.
308.
"at least

691 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. The court further noted that the petitioner's claims particularly deserved review since
one ... present[ed] a substantial question." Id.
309. Berger, supranote 188, at 295; Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2558.
310. See Berger, supranote 188, at 294.
311. Petitioners have a constitutional right to challenge their method of execution pursuant to
the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; Berger, supranote 188, at 295.
312. See Berger, supranote 188, at 294.
313. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2557.
314. Berger, supra note 188, at 294-95.
315. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 946 (2007) (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S.
147, 154 (2007) (per curiam)); see also Simmons, supra note 281, at 1265 (explaining how Eighth
Amendment claims regarding prolonged confinement on death row necessarily become ripe only
"when execution is imminent").
316. Bruhl, supra note 6, at 257.
317. See Boaz, supranote 4, at 358-59.
318. See Berger, supra note 188, at 294-95 (discussing the disproportionate weight courts give
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rely on the presumption that the underlying claims lack merit and deny
the stay petitions without sufficiently considering relevant evidence.3 1 9
At times, this happens even where the petitioner did not bring the claim
at the last minute.3 20 While collateral review must be limited to preserve
finality, 32' the number of stays denied for fear of abuse of the judicial
system too often encompasses stay petitions that are accompanied by
meritorious claims 322 and results in the execution of undeserving
prisoners who were not granted sufficient review. 323 The courts are
324 However, most capital appeals are not
justified in their concern.
325
"legally frivolous.,
Thus, the effect of denying stays to prevent "abuse
327
326
deterring actual abuse.
beyond
goes
of the writ
Even supporters of the death penalty worry "about the danger of
executing the innocent." 328 The availability of DNA evidence has
revealed the innocence of death-sentenced individuals years after their
convictions. 329 For some, the court's willingness to grant a stay of
to the delay factor).
319. Berger, supra note 188, at 294-95; Boaz, supra note 4, at 369 (noting that the lack of
order and certainty surrounding the courts' jurisprudence in expediting death sentences distorts the
deliberative process); Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2557 (discussing how judges often deny stays due
to irritation with last-minute petitions). Fortunately, this is not always the case. See, e.g., O'Bryan v.
Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982). In O'Bryan, the court granted the petition to stay the
execution of the death sentence, even though the petition was presented to the court only days
before the scheduled execution. Id.The court reasoned that it needed more than a "few days" to
provide the adequate review of the petitioner's claims to which he was constitutionally entitled. Id.
Similarly, in Morales v. Cate, although the petitioner filed his stay petition about two weeks prior to
his scheduled execution, the court granted the stay. No. 5-6-cv-219-JF-HRL, 2010 WL 3835655, at
*1, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010) ("[T]here is no way that the Court can engage in a thorough
analysis of the relevant factual and legal issues in the days remaining before [petitioner]'s execution
date.").
320. Berger, supra note 188, at 295 n.191.
321. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2560.
322. Id.at 2562-64.
323. Boaz, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing how constitutional errors attached to executed
individuals have gone undiscovered due to limited federal review); see also Bruhl, supra note 6, at
256 (arguing in favor of granting stays of execution in capital cases because "errors cannot be
'fixed' later").
324. See Veilleux, supra note 1,at 2557-59, 2561 (noting that sometimes petitioners do abuse
the writ of habeas corpus by unnecessarily reserving claims for successive petitions solely in hopes
of postponing their executions).
325. Boaz, supra note 4, at 357-58 (defining "legally frivolous" as an issue that has no factual
basis or is preempted by a Supreme Court decision).
326. See Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2562.
327. See id. at 2564.
328. Bright, supranote 31, at 2.
329. See id. at 5.
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execution to consider the evidence has corrected the previous error and
prevented injustice.330 For others, the evidence was not discovered until
it was too late. 331 For example, in Jones v. Johnson,332 Claude Jones,
who was convicted and sentenced to death based on a strand of hair,
petitioned for a stay of execution to allow time for DNA tests to be
conducted on the hair strand.333 The petition was denied and Jones was
executed.3 34 About ten years335
later, DNA tests established that the hair in:
fact did not belong to Jones.
Subsequent evidence of innocence is not limited to DNA
discoveries.336 Anthony Porter had the execution of his death sentence
stayed pending the determination of his mental competency.3 37 In the
meantime, and fortunately for Porter, a private investigator and college
journalism class were able to obtain a confession from the individual
who actually committed the crime for which Porter had been sentenced
to death. 338 Recognizing a potential flaw in Illinois's system, thenGovernor George Ryan, a supporter of the death penalty, 339 called a
moratorium on the execution of death sentences pending a system that
would eliminate such error.340
Unfortunately, the individual sentenced to death in Willingham v.
Johnson34 1 was not as lucky as Porter.34 2 There, the court sentenced the
defendant to death for murder by arson, based largely on the testimony
of arson experts.343 Prior to his execution, emerging discoveries in fire
science revealed the invalidity of the indicia of intentional arson relied
330. See
Innocence
Project
Case
Profiles,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited July 27, 2012). Of the 289 total post-conviction
exonerations based on subsequent DNA evidence, seventeen had been sentenced to death. Id.
331. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Executing an Innocent Man, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 15, 2010,
3:56 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/79177/executing-innocent-man.
332. 211 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 2000).
333. Id. at 124; Cohn, supranote 331.
334. Jones,211 F.3d at 124; Cohn, supra note 331.
335. Cohn, supranote 331.
336. See infra text accompanying notes 337-38.
337. Bright, supra note 31, at 6.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 7. The State of Illinois has since abolished the death penalty. It's Official: On July
1st, SB3539 Became LA W!, ILL. COAL. TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY,
http://www.icadp.org/content/its-official-july- lst-sb3539-became-law (last visited July 27, 2012).
341. No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-0409-L, 2001 WL 1677023 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2001).
342. Compare Willingham, 2001 WL 1677023, at *25 (denying the petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus), with Bright, supra note 31, at 6 (discussing Porter's situation).
343. See Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
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on by the experts who testified against Willingham. 34 Willingham filed
a habeas petition, but he did not have time to have his innocence claims
heard prior to his execution.345 In the years following Willingham's
execution, "the evidence of arson introduced at his trial ha[d] been
largely disproven. ' , 346 Thus, "[i]n certain cases such as that of Cameron
Todd Willingham,... refusal to stay an execution may actually hinder
society's quest for a feeling of finality and closure. 34 7
It is true that it is hard for courts and convicting parties to ever be
entirely certain that "the crime and requisite culpability for
punishment... occurred. 348 However, it is particularly disconcerting
that such a practice is used in death penalty cases due to the severe and
permanent nature of the sentence.34 9 In order for the state's interests to
be consistent with justice, reliable procedure must be in place to not only
reduce the risk of error and uncertainty, but also allow for an expeditious
execution process. 350 Therefore, although post-conviction appeals may
prolong the finality of the judgment,35 1 they "are essential to ensure the
reliability of the convictions and sentences,, 352 especially in the capital
context.

35 3

4. Protecting the State's Interests: The AEDPA
To address the various state interests in the expeditious execution of
the death sentences that it imposes, Congress enacted the AEDPA.3 54
Specifically, the AEDPA imposes both substantive and procedural
obstacles to a death-sentenced individual's ability to gain federal habeas

344.

Jonathan Aminoff, Something Very Wrong is Taking Place Tonight: The Diminishing

Impact of the Actual Innocence Exception on Eligibilityfor the Death Penalty, CRIM. L. BULL. Jan.Feb. 2010, at 86, 134; Callahan, supranote 257, at 630 n.6.
345. Willingham, 2001 WL 1677023, at *2; Aminoff, supranote 344, at 134.
346. Callahan, supra note 257, at 630.
347. Id. at 661 (citation omitted).
348. Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 454.
349.

See Sherrell, supra note 31, at 475.

350. See Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 454.
351.

Seeid.

352. Sherrell, supra note 31, at 455.
353. Id. at 455-56 ("Post-conviction appeals are an essential ingredient of the capital
defendant's efforts to ensure that his conviction and sentence are constitutional.").
354. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,436 (2000)
(explaining that "there is no doubt" that Congress enacted the AEDPA to advance "the principles of
comity, finality, and federalism"); Callahan, supra note 257, at 646, 650; Macmanus, supra note 26,
at 895.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:771

relief.355 These obstacles further the state's interests by, inter alia,
limiting successive petitions, requiring that state remedies be exhausted,
356
and imposing a statute of limitations.
While the AEDPA preserves federal jurisdiction over original
habeas petitions, it imposes limitations on a convicted individual's
ability to file successive petitions.3 57 Accordingly, "no Federal
court ... shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution.., unless
the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive
application. 3 58 Petitioners cannot bring claims litigated in previous
habeas corpus petitions in a successive petition, 359 and any new claims
must present new rules of constitutional law 360 or facts "sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that" a constitutional error
resulted in the petitioner's guilty verdict. 361 These restrictions protect the

state's interests of preventing abuse of the writ and finality since they
severely limit the claims available to the petitioner on successive
petitions.362 This effectively lowers the chances that the court will be
presented with frivolous or manipulatively postponed claims and makes
final the judgments rendered on the original petition.36 3
The AEDPA further imposes a one-year statute of limitations on the
time the petitioner has to file his or her habeas petition. 364 The
commencement of the statute of limitations varies depending on the
claim, 365 but in all circumstances "plac[es] a temporal constraint on the
ability of prisoners to challenge convictions. 36 6 This effectively restricts

355. Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 448-49.
356. Id. at 450-53. The AEDPA also limits state prisoners' ability to challenge claims that were
decided "on the merits in State court proceedings," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) and generally bars
claims that were not raised properly in state court. Id. § 2254(e)(2); see also Kovarsky, supra note
271, at 449-52 (discussing the AEDPA).
357. Macmanus, supra note 26, at 890. Individuals sentenced to death, in particular, are likely
to file successive petitions. Veilleux, supra note 1, at 2549.
358. 28 U.S.C. § 2262(c).
359. Id. § 2244(b)(1).
360. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). This provision is essentially a codification of Teague. Kovarsky,
supra note 271, at 448-49. Accordingly, these new rules of constitutional law must be "made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
361. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B); see also Kovarsky, supranote 271, at 451-52 n.44 (explaining
the AEDPA).
362. See Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 450-52, 454.
363. See id. at 450-52.
364. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Kovarsky, supranote 271, at 453.
365. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D); Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 453.
366. Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 453.
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the petitioners'
ability to be heard, but caters to the state's interest of
67
3

finality.

Moreover, the AEDPA protects federalism since it provides that
writs of habeas corpus generally cannot be granted unless state remedies
are exhausted.368 Accordingly, any claims regarding a state court
conviction will not reach the federal courts unless the petitioner
previously sought relief from every appellate tribunal in the convicting
state. 369 The AEDPA allows the state to waive the exhaustion
requirement only through an express statement made with the aid of
counsel. 370 This surely "give[s] the state courts an opportunity to act on
[the] claims." 37 '
The AEDPA is not without critics. For instance, the American Bar
Association "has urged Congress and the courts to preserve full habeas
corpus review." 372 Others are of the view that "the basic premise behind
habeas relief ... [is] that finality must take a back seat to justice," 373 and
further that, "Congress can not and should not be allowed to destroy the
Court's role through the passage of legislation designed to promote an
efficient, as opposed to a just, result., 374 However, despite the additional
hurdles that the AEDPA arguably imposes on the ability of deathsentenced individuals to obtain relief, it remains in effect and protects
the various interests of the state.375
Courts should consider any relevant prospective legislation when
evaluating petitions to stay the executions of death sentences.376
Providing guidelines that remove some of the courts' discretion
surrounding stays have proven to be both functional and beneficial in
other areas of law.3 77 Therefore, doing so in the capital context-where
individuals' lives are at risk-will not violate the legal system. 378 While

367.
529 U.S.
368.
note 271,
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.; see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
420, 436 (2000)).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005); Kovarsky, supra
at 452.
Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 452.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3); Kovarsky, supra note 271, at 452.
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
Bright, supra note 31, at 4.
Swallows, supra note 27, at 930.
Macmanus, supra note 26, at 912.
See supratext accompanying notes 354-56.
See supratext accompanying notes 188-93.
See supraPart IV.A.
See supraPart HI.C.
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denying petitions for stays of executions supports the state's interests of
finality and federalism,379 it can prohibit the capital prisoner from having
his or her constitutional claims heard and result in the inadvertent
execution of innocent individuals.38 ° Although the interests of the state
are certainly legitimate, the more courts continue to give such
disproportionate weight to the state's interests, the less available stays
will become and the more likely a deserving petitioner's stay will be
denied. 38 1 "Even if one were to argue that the state's interest in capital
cases includes extraneous externalities such as cost or efficiency, there is
no basis to argue that these interests outweigh the life of a human
being. 3 82 Moreover, although the AEDPA arguably "curtails the ability
of federal courts to enter a stay of execution for capital defendants, 383
its enactment preserves the various state interests.3 84 Thus, postponing an
execution in the face of relevant proposed legislation that may afford
prisoners a chance at 385
life will not unduly interfere with the state's
interests.
countervailing
V.

CONCLUSION

The broad discretion given to courts to grant or deny stays of
execution has resulted in inconsistency and injustice for capital
defendants. 386 Providing courts with more stringent guidelines to follow
when evaluating petitions to stay executions could ameliorate this
problem.3 87 Particularly, courts should uniformly consider granting stays
of execution where a bill that could affect the defendant's sentence has
been introduced into Congress. 388 Although there is no definitive way to
know whether the bill will pass, granting stays in the meantime will at
least afford defendants the opportunity to present a claim that otherswho were fortunate enough to have later execution dates-will
379. See supra Part IV.D. 1-2.
380. See Veilleux, supranote 1, at 2545, 2558, 2562-64.
381. Id.at2557.
382. Macmanus, supra note 26, at 901.
383. Id. at 882 (arguing that the AEDPA is unconstitutional because it interferes with courts'
abilities to stay the executions of death sentences).
384. See supra Part IV.D.4.
385. See Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2870-71 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
"it is difficult to see how the State's interest in the immediate execution of an individual convicted
of capital murder 16 years ago can outweigh the considerations that support additional delay").
386. See supra text accompanying notes 10-23.
387. Seesupra Part IV.A-B.
388. See supra Part 1V.B.
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potentially have the ability to present. 389 Therefore, courts should
balance the existence of any relevant proposed legislation against the
to
state's interests in an expeditious execution when deciding whether
39
0
grant or deny petitions to stay the execution of death sentences.
Rebecca R. Sklar*

389. See supra Part 1V.B.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 224-30.
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